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Abstract. In auction theory, cryptography has been used to achieve
anonymity of the participants, security and privacy of the bids, secure
computation and to simulate mediator (auctioneer). Auction theory fo-
cuses on revenue and Cryptography focuses on security and privacy. In-
volving Cryptography at base level, to enhance revenue gives entirely
new perspective and insight to Auction theory, thereby achieving the
core goals of auction theory. In this report, we try to investigate an
interesting field of study in Auction Theory using Cryptographic primi-
tives.
1 Introduction
1.1 Cryptography Primitives
Yao’s Millionaires protocol[1] is the fundamental protocol of modern Cryptog-
raphy, used by two parties to compare their secret value without third party
intervention. For example, if two millionaires want to know which of them is
richer without revealing their actual wealth to each other, or any other third
person, Yao’s protocol can be used. This problem is analogous to a more gen-
eral problem where there are two numbers a and b and the goal is to solve the
inequality a ≥ b without revealing the actual values of a and b.
1.2 Auctions theory Basics
A first-price sealed-bid auction:
A first-price sealed-bid auction is a form of auction where bidders submit one bid
in a concealed fashion. The submitted bids are then compared and the person
with the highest bid wins the award, and pays the amount of his bid to the seller.
Asymmetric bidders
If the the probability distribution from which the bidders obtain their values is
identical across bidders, then they are symmetric bidders, otherwise asymmetric
bidders.
Related work in Auction theory
Landsberger et.al[2] in the paper ”First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of
Valuations is Common Knowledge” studied a one unit two bidders game where
the valuations ranking is known. At the beginning of the game, the valuations are
drawn from a distribution that is common knowledge and the seller announces
who is the bidder with the highest valuation. This set-up induces a particular
asymmetric auction model and proved existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
in pure strategies in the two-bidder case.
Philippe[3] considered a sequential auction where two identical goods are sold
sequentially via first price auctions to players who are interested in both objects.
In sealed bid auctions, no information is a priori revealed by the mechanism, but
the seller can in principle reveal whatever he wants. They have considered the
case where, only the information revealed between the two stages of the game
is the name of the winner in the first auction. They have proved that, the seller
must not reveal the name of the winner between the two auctions and instead
sell both goods using a simultaneous auction, to get more revenue.
2 Auctions with Cryptographic pre-play
Now, let us consider a situation where, there are two parties who are going to
bid in first price sealed bid auction. We assume that parties have interest to
compare their bids. If these two parties, prior to actual auction (say trail auc-
tion), compare their bid using Yao’ protocol, to know who’s bid is higher, then
few interesting question arise,
What will they bid in actual auction?
Will it increase or decrease overall revenue of actual auction?
The solution seems to be trivial. The looser in trail auction will increase his
bid in actual action, and winner will decrease his bid in actual auction. It is
important to note that the above information is common knowledge to both the
parties. Considering this fact, the looser may not increase his bid assuming that
the winner is going to decrease(or may not increase) his bid and vice versa. To
solve this we need to adopt strong auction theory model. An asymmetry arises
here because the players who participate in the actual auction already partici-
pated in the trail auction. The information given at the end of the trail auction
is used by the bidders to revise their beliefs and the actual auction must be
studied under the hypothesis that bidders are asymmetric. Sometimes it must
be assumed that the distribution function is no longer common knowledge.
Basically, we have to answer the following questions.
What will the player bid in trial auction?
What is the equilibrium of trail auction?
Players may fake their bid in the trail auction, if it is going to increase their
pay off (revenue) in actual auction. Participating in trial auction with the honest
bid gives some information about other party’s bid, but at the same time leaks
the information about their own bid.
3 Conclusion
Currently we are working on this problem. Even though, we could not conclude
anything concretely yet, it is interesting to study the effects of using cryptogra-
phy protocols in Auction Theory. Any change in auction revenue, with Crypto-
graphic pre-play has significant impact on Auction theory.
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